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A Shot At Stricter Controls: Strict
Liability For Gun Manufacturers*
Every 13 seconds a new handgun is manufactured or sold in this
country. Every two minutes the police take a handgun from some-
one. And every 20 minutes, someone is killed with a handgun.
That's an unacceptable product history for any product.'
Gun control proponents believe that the old-fashioned capitalist the-
ory of supply and demand may actually work against the concept of an
orderly society.2 Statistics illustrate this point. Researchers estimate
* During the final stages of publication, Assembly Bill 75 was signed by Governor
Deukmejian and became Chapter 1299 of the 1983 Statutes of California. Chapter 1299 added
section 1714.4 to the Civil Code, which provides that in a products liability action, no firearm or
ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do
not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death
when discharged. Subdivision (c) of section 1714.4, however, does not preclude a products
liability action alleging that a safer alternative design was available to the manufacturer.
Although this change in statutory law impacts upon various theories advocated by this comment,
an analysis of a strict products liability action against gun manufacturers remains worthy of
examination. The central theme of this comment is the building of a strict products liability caseusing the theories of Barker i. Lull Engineering Co. The illustration presented in this comment
easily can be applied to products other than firearms and ammunition. Furthermore, although a
strict products liability cause of action against gun manufacturers may be foreclosed in California,
many states have developed case law that is similar to the Barker line of cases. See, e.g.,
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (1974). Consequently, the theories advocated by
this author concerning the possible design defects of a small handgun with a barrel length of 2
inches or shorter (a snubby) may be used in jurisdictions that have not foreclosed the cause of
action. Finally, at this point, the interpretation of subdivision (c) of section 1714.4 is uncertain;
just how broadly this subdivision will be applied to exempt alternative design cases remains to be
decided. This comment asserts that alternative designs of handguns are available to take the place
of a snubby. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. Therefore, a manufacturer's
decision to produce a snubby arguably could constitute an improper selection of design
alternatives. Since this design theory was not affected by Chapter 1299, a strict products liability
cause of action against gun manufacturers still might be brought successfully.
Civil Code Section 17144.4:
(a) In a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defective
in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury
posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death when discharged.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) The potential of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, damage, or
death when discharged does not make the product defective in design.
(2) Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm or ammunition
are not proximately caused by its potential to cause serious injury, damage, or
death, but are proximately caused by the actual discharge of the product.
(c) This section shall not affect a products liability cause of action based upon the
improper selection of design alternatives.
(d) This section is declaratory of existing law.
1. Transcript from 60 Minutes, Warning: Dangerous to Your Health, October 24, 1982, at 7
(quoting Windle Turley, a products liability attorney from Dallas, Texas) (Copy of transcript on
file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Transcript]).
2. See Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal) In Guns, HARPERtS, Sept., 1977, at 37.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
that as of April, 1981, 50 million handguns existed in the United
States,3 and the numbers were expected to increase to 54 million by the
end of that year.4 Although these numbers are staggering, handguns
comprise only 20% of all firearms in the United States.5 Nevertheless,
the harmful impact of handguns on society far exceeds their propor-
tional representation within the class of firearms. In particular, hand-
guns account for 90% of all gun related deaths and injuries,6 resulting
in approximately 22,000 deaths per year.7
Confronted with these frightening numbers, the majority of Ameri-
cans have continually expressed a desire for more restrictions on hand-
guns.8 Recent attempts to limit the availability of handguns through
statutory means, however, have failed.9 An example of the failure to
impose statutory restrictions occurred in California recently when
Proposition 15,10 a gun control initiative, was defeated by a two to one
margin.'" Many gun control proponents blame the powerful "gun lob-
bies" for the failure of proposed gun control laws. 2 The lobby thought
to be primarily responsible for defeating gun control legislation is the
National Rifle Association, which has been called the most effective
lobbying organization in Washington, D.C. 3 Through the efforts of
the National Rifle Association, a uniform regulatory scheme aimed at
gun control remains an elusive goal.'4 As a result, a "patchwork" of
inconsistent and barely enforceable regulations has resulted.' 5
The gun control regulatory scheme in California exemplifies this
problem. Under existing California statutes, all concealable weapons
must be registered. 6 The failure to register a handgun results in a
mere misdemeanor charge with a maximum fine of $50.17 In a profita-
3. See Smith, Fifty Million Handguns, ESQUIRE, Apr., 1981, at 23.
4. Should Handguns be Outlawed? Interview with Michael Beard, U.S. NEws AND WORLD
REPORT, Dec. 22, 1980, at 23 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
5. Taking Aim at Handguns, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982, at 42 [hereinafter cited as Taking
Aim].
6. Id.
7. Guns in The Courts, THE ATLANTIC, May, 1983, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Guns].
8. It's Time to Ban Handguns, TIME, Apr. 13, 1981, at 51 [hereinafter cited as TIME]. A 1981
Gallup Poll found that 62% of Americans favor some type of restriction on handguns. Id.
9. See THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 29, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
10. Proposition 15, California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election 1982, at 60 (copy on file at
the Pacific Law Journal).
1 I. See The Sacramento Bee, Nov. 3, 1982, at 3, col. 5.




16. CAL. PENAL CODE §12073. Those engaged in the business of selling handguns at
retail are required to keep a register identifying the person purchasing the gun as well as
a description of the gun, which could be used to identify it at a future point in time. The
register is open for inspection by the police at all times. Id. §12350.
17. Id. §12351.
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ble retail handgun business, a small fine does not effectively deter re-
tailers from keeping inaccurate records. 8 Furthermore, registration
requirements do not address the problem of handguns reaching the
"wrong people" - those who will use them to perpetrate a crime rather
than those who want them for self-defense or sport. 9 One final inade-
quacy of this regulatory scheme is that fines do not benefit the person
who ultimately falls victim to a crime involving an unregistered
handgun.2°
In reaction to the lack of an effective legislative remedy to this prob-
lem, gun control proponents now seek a solution from the courts.2' A
growing number of people believe that private civil litigation can more
effectively achieve the goal of fewer handgun related injuries and
deaths than can the enforcement of criminal laws or the implementa-
tion of gun control legislation.2 2 A potent reason for resorting to civil
litigation is that the courts can deal with the gun control issue more
efficiently than the legislature due to the reduced amount of political
pressure placed on judges and juries.23 The specific judicial remedy
looked to is in the field of strict products liability.24 Gun control propo-
nents want to hold gun manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused
by their "defective" guns.25 Under strict products liability principles, a
product is defectively designed if the product is placed on the market
with the knowledge that it will be used without an inspection for de-
fects, and the product then causes personal injury because of the
defect.
26
Supplied with this theory, many plaintiffs are asserting that a small
handgun, with a barrel length of 21/2 inches or shorter (hereinafter re-
ferred to as a "snubby"), is defectively designed because the short bar-
rel allows easy concealment, making snubbies the "criminal's weapon
of choice."2 Most plaintiffs tend to use some variation of the test first
advocated by Deans Wade and Keeton for strict products liability, the
18. See Moore, Keeping Handguns From Criminal Offenders, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, May, 1981, at 92. Only 10% of all federally licensed dealers are
investigated within a given year. Fewer than 1% have any action taken against them. Id.
19. See id. Even though there are statutes that make certain individuals ineligible to
purchase guns, this does not prevent a retailer from being deceived, or merely overlooking dis-
qualifying characteristics in order to make a sale. Id.
20. See Handguns New Target For Tort Lawyers, 67 A.B.A.J. 1443 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as New Target].
21. See TakingAim, supra note 5, at 42.
22. See id
23. See New Target, supra note 20, at 1443.
24. See generally id
25. See generally id
26. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d, 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, (1963).
27. See Guns, supra note 7, at 12.
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"hazards v. utility" test.28 By applying this test, these plaintiffs intend to
show that the inherent hazards posed by a handgun outweigh any pos-
sible social utility of the weapon, thus creating a "defect."29 These
plaintiffs believe that an expansion of the theory of strict liability will
encourage the firearm industry to take steps to keep handguns from
reaching inappropriate persons.
3 0
This comment will explore the possibility of bringing a strict prod-
ucts liability case against gun manufacturers in California. Initially,
the discussion will focus on policy factors that would permit this cause
of action. Once a foundation is laid the next step will be to illustrate
what plaintiffs must show in their prima facie case when claiming that
a handgun is defectively designed. The discussion of the prima facie
case will involve the following issues: (1) the expectations of a hand-
gun consumer; (2) the foreseeability of misuse and harm caused by a
handgun; and (3) the question of whether the design of a handgun can
be the proximate cause of injury. Within the topic of proximate cause
will be an analysis of intervening criminal conduct and a discussion of
whether this conduct supersedes the liability of gun manufacturers.
After establishing the prima facie case, this comment will apply the
risk/benefit test defined by the California Supreme Court in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co. , a landmark case illustrating the use of strict
products liability in California. As applied to handguns, the
risk/benefit test balances the social utility of a handgun small enough
to be hidden and used in crime against the inherent hazards posed by
the same design. The test will be analyzed in terms of five factors that
juries in California must consider in all strict products liability cases.
In addition, the potential scope of liability will be explored to demon-
strate that the retailer as well as the manufacturer may face liability
under this theory. Finally, this comment will conclude that defective
design claims against gun manufacturers can succeed in California us-
ing the theories found in Barker and other cases dealing with strict
products liability. As a preliminary matter, however, a consideration
of the various policies permitting these claims is necessary.
CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PUBLIC POLICY
In California, when a manufacturer places a product on the market
with the knowledge that the product will be used without an inspection
for defects, and the product then proves to have a defect that causes
28. See New Target, supra note 20, at 1443.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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personal injury, the manufacturer will be strictly liable in tort.32 The
policy underlying strict liability is to insure that the manufacturers,
rather than injured persons who are theoretically powerless to protect
themselves, bear the costs of injury resulting from the use of a defective
product.33 Discouraging manufacturers from marketing products with
defects that "menace" the public presumably serves the public
interest.
34
The specific type of defect that is the focus of these claims against
gun manufacturers is a design defect.35 A product has a design defect if
the design of the product causes injury to a human being when used in
a normal or foreseeable manner.36 Attorneys currently litigating actions
against gun manufacturers claim that the design of a snubby, with a
barrel length of 2 inches or less, is defective because the size of a
snubby permits easy concealment for use in crime. 7
Traditionally, this argument could not have been made because
handguns posed an obvious danger 3 that precluded the existence of a
design defect. Recent California cases, however, suggest that the obvi-
ousness of the danger will not bar manufacturer liability.39For exam-
ple, California courts have stated that inequity would result if a
plaintiff could recover when a manufacturer negligently marketed a de-
fective product, but could not recover under strict liability theories
when the manufacturer knowingly marketed an obviously dangerous
product.40 If the foregoing were allowed, manufacturers who know-
ingly ignore the dangerous characteristics of their products would be
protected from strict liability claims, while manufacturers who negli-
gently market defective products would be subject to liability.4' Since
manufacturers of obviously dangerous products are more likely to sat-
isfy negligence standards of reasonability, strict products liability may
be the only option open to plaintiffs injured by those obviously danger-
ous products.42 As the Barker court suggested, a manufacturer's liabil-
32. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (1963).
33. Comment, Strict Products Liability: Giving Content to the Term "Defect'in Design Cases,
40 OHIO ST. L. J. 209, 219 (1979).
34. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d. 436, 441 (1944).
35. See New Target, supra note 20, at 1444.
36. See Comment, supra note 33, at 212.
37. See Guns, supra note 7, at 10.
38. See Thompson v. Package Machinery Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 192, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281,
283 (1971). The modem approach to products liability does not preclude liability solely because a
danger is obvious, even if the obviousness of the peril is conceded. See id.
39. See id.
40. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972).
41. See Id.
42. See generaly id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal.Rptr. at 449 (discussing the applicability
of strict products liability to products with latent defects).
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ity does not disappear merely because the product is dangerous. 43
Consequently, a manufacturer could be liable for the design of a dan-
gerous product even though a safer alternative design does not exist.44
Following the above rationale, gun manufacturers will not be immune
from strict liability claims in California merely because the handgun is
an obviously dangerous product. An important question to ask, there-
fore, is whether the obvious danger posed by the handgun results from
its defective design, and as a preliminary matter, who carries the bur-
den of answering this question.
ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF A DEFECT: PLAINTIFF'S PRIMA
FACIE CASE
To prove the existence of a design defect, California courts have held
that the injured plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case.45
To build the prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the
snubby did not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary consumer,
(2) the snubby was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-




The first step in deciding whether a defect exists in the design of a
handgun is to explore consumer expectations.47 Some writers suggest
that this consumer expectation element reflects a warranty analysis:48
"When a manufacturer places a: product on the market, a representa-
tion is impliedly made that the product is safe for the tasks it was
designed to accomplish. 49
Since most people recognize the possibility of harm or death result-
ing from the use of a handgun, the dangers posed by a snubby do not
necessarily go beyond the dangers contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer. California courts have held, however, that many situations ex-
ist where the consumer cannot form a reasonable expectation because
information as to safer alternatives is not common knowledge in the
community.5" Statistics help prove that consumer expectations are not
43. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978).
44. See id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
45. See Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 877, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (1978).
46. See id.
47. See 20 Cal. 3d at 429, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (1978).
48. See Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 118, 649 P.2d 224, 227, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 891, 894 (1982).
49. Id.
50. See Mattingly v. Anthony Industries, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 506, 511, 167 Cal. Rptr. 292,
294 (1980).
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met in relation to handguns.' 1 For example, most consumers would not
expect that a gun kept in the house is six times more likely to kill a
member of the family as opposed to an intruder,52 or that approxi-
mately one-half of the guns used in crime are stolen from the house-
holds they were supposed to protect.53 In regard to the consumer
expectation that a handgun will provide some form of protection, sta-
tistics from the city of San Francisco show that this belief is illusory. 4
In 1981, statistics for San Francisco showed that handguns were used in
self-defense only four times. Conversely, handguns caused over 50%
of the homicides in the city,56 resulting in 126 deaths.57  Furthermore,
a handgun kept in the home for protection is normally not readily ac-
cessible and often will be used by intruders against the owners whom
the handguns were to protect. 8
Since the burden of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case
does not require a showing beyond a reasonable doubt,59 these statistics
may help meet this burden by showing that consumer expectations of
handgun safety might not be met. The consumer expectation element
of a prima facie case of design defect, thus, can be proved by admitting
the statistical evidence. The next step in the prima facie case is to de-
termine whether the handgun was used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner.
2. Foreseeability of Misuse and Harm
The second element of the plaintiffs prima facie case, that the prod-
uct was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, could
be difficult to prove when the product in question is a handgun. Specif-
ically, a major area of debate concerning the application of the Barker
test to handguns concerns the issues of foreseeability of misuse and in-
tervening criminal conduct.6" To reiterate the point, California public
policy strives to place the responsibility for defective products where
that burden will most likely result in the lessening of the hazards to life
51. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
52. See Reno, Why I Don't Want a Gun, MCCALL'S, Mar., 1982, at 146 (quoting a 15 year
study by the School of Medicine of Case Western Reserve University).
53. See Smith, supra note 3, at 24.
54. Shot Down, TIME, July 12, 1983, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Shot Down].
55. See id
56. Id.
57. Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Crime and Delinquency in Cali-
fornia, at 14-15 (198 1)(copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Crime].
58. See Guns, supra note 7, at 12.
59. See Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 121, 649 P.2d 224, 229, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 891, 896 (1982).
60. See generally Fischer, Are HandgunManufacturers Strictly Liable in Tort, 56 CAL. ST. B.J.
17 (1981).
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and health.6' The test is whether the seller, at the time of the sale,
should have reasonably anticipated that the buyer would use the gun in
a criminal manner.62 Early cases developing the theory of strict prod-
ucts liability required manufacturers to foresee some degree of misuse
and abuse of the product, either by the user or third parties, and to take
precautions to minimize these dangers.63  These cases held that manu-
facturers should be required to recognize the realities of everyday life
instead of functioning within an "industrial vacuum" when designing
or manufacturing products.64
Just as these manufacturers were required to recognize the realities
of everyday life, gun manufacturers should be required to consider the
realities of handgun usage when designing handguns. As previously
noted, one stark reality is that 90% of all gun related deaths in the
United States can be attributed to handguns .6  This figure includes
both accidental and criminal deaths.6 6 In California, 68% of all homi-
cides committed with firearms involved the use of handguns. 6 Hand-
guns also are often used in robberies and assaults.68 These statistics
suggest that handgun manufacturers should reasonably foresee that
their products will be used to harm or kill people, and furthermore,
that this harm is a foreseeable result.
The issue of foreseeability of harm caused by handguns can be clari-
fied by drawing an analogy to the application of strict liability princi-
ples to auto manufacturers.6 9 For example, motor vehicles are not
intended to collide in normal usage.7 0 Case law, however, has held that
collisions must be considered a reasonably foreseeable occurrence. 71
Consequently, because of the reasonably foreseeable occurrence of a
collision, a manufacturer must design the car to minimize unreasonable
risks of injury and death.72 The design does not have to cause the acci-
dent for recovery to follow as long as the design substantially contrib-
61. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 439 (1944).
62. See Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 337, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194,
199 (1969).
63. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 127, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 437 (1972).
64. See McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1012, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698
(1978).
65. See Taking.Aim, supra note 5, at 42.
66. See generaiiy id.
67. See Department of Justice, Homicide in California, 61 (1981)(a report issued by the At-
torney General of California) (copy on file at the Pacic Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as De-
partment of Justice].
68. See Crime, supra note 57, at 14-15.
69. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
70. Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1974).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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uted to the plaintiffs injury.71
In a similar vein, the design of a snubby does not have to be the
actual cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Liability will ensue if the
plaintiff establishes that the design of a snubby substantially contrib-
uted to the plaintiffs injury because the design enabled the criminal to
hide the weapon, thus facilitating the commission of a crime leading to
the plaintiffs injuries. This could be accomplished by showing that
snubbies are the criminals' weapons of choice.74 Specifically, studies in
18 cities reveal that of the handguns used in murders, rapes, robberies,
and muggings, two out of three were snubbies.
75
Although the plaintiff may prove that consumer expectations of
handgun safety are not met by the snubby, and that foreseeability of
injury can be demonstrated, a major obstacle remains to be overcome.
Handgun plaintiffs must also prove the defect was the proximate cause
of the harm suffered.
3. Proximate Cause
California courts have avoided formulating rigid rules pertaining to
the issue of proximate cause.7 6 Rather, the courts have expressed a be-
lief that factual matters surrounding proximate causation must be left
for juries to handle on a case-by-case basis.77 Normally, in a strict
products liability action as in a negligence action, the legal cause of
injury can be a concurrent cause of the injury.78 The plaintiff merely
must show that the legal cause was operative at the moment the injury
occurred.79
With this in mind, a handgun designed so that it can be hidden and
used in a crime should be viewed as a concurrent cause with the crimi-
nal act because the defect exists at the time of the injury. 0 Specifically,
a snubby, which is small enough to be hidden in a pocket, should be
considered a cause of injury because the design of the gun allows the
criminal to enter a store with the snubby unnoticed. When the gun is
73. See Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 926, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100
(1977).
14. The Snub Nosed Killers: Handguns in America, A Cox Newspaper Series, at 3 (1981)
(copy on file at the Pacfic Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Killers]; see also Transcript, supra
note 1, at 8.
75. See Killers, supra note 74, at 3.
76. Fierro v. International Harvester Co., 127 Cal. App. 3d 862, 868, 179 Cal. Rptr. 923, 926
(1982).
77. See id.
78. Thompson v. Package Machinery Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 193-95, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281, 285
(1971).
79. Id.
80. See generally id. This illustration is based upon the legal theories found within Thomp-
son. See id.
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later used to rob the owner, the criminal act of employing the gun
should be seen as just another concurrent cause of the store owner's
injuries." Therefore, submission to a jury of a strict products liability
question involving a snubby should not be precluded simply because
other causes for the harm exist, such as the intervening act of a crimi-
nal. 2 Nevertheless, a discussion of criminal intervention and its possi-
ble effect on a manufacturer's liability would be helpful in making the
proximate cause aspect of this analysis more complete.
a. Intervening Criminal Conduct
Under basic negligence principles, a third person's intentionally tor-
tious or criminal behavior will supersede the initial cause of the harm,
even though the initial cause gave the third person the opportunity to
act in this tortious or criminal manner.8 3 If, however, the criminal act
is a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct, the criminal act
will not supersede responsibility for the negligence, and the chain of
causation will remain unbroken. 4 Since most theories of causation
within the area of negligence, including proximate cause, cross over
and apply to strict products liability, 5 this argument should be avail-
able with regard to handguns.
To illustrate the way this theory is applied in negligence actions, a
discussion of one of the leading cases in the area of criminal interven-
tion would be of assistance. In O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corpo-
ration, 6 the California appellate court found that a landlord of an
apartment building in an urban residential area had a duty to protect
the tenants of the building from criminal activity.87 In O'Hara the
landlord concealed information about a man who had raped several
female tenants. The landlord also represented to the plaintiff that the
building had adequate security."8 The landlord's failure to take rea-
sonable precautions to safeguard the common areas of the apartment
building, in light of the fact that criminal activity was prevalent in that
community, was determined to have contributed heavily to the tenant's
injury. 9 Thus, according to O'Hara, if a person's conduct places an-
other in a position of unknown or unexpected peril, that conduct could
81. See generally id. (illustration based on Thompson).
82. See generally id (illustration based on Thompson).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448 (1976).
84. Id.
85. See 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 194, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281, 285.
86. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
87. Id. at 802-03, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
88. Id. at 801-02, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
89. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490; see also McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295,
299, 195 P.2d 783, 786 (1948).
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result in liability even though the injuries resulted from the criminal
conduct of another.
90
Few difficulties are involved in applying these principles to snubbies
and the injuries caused by them as a result of the criminal conduct of a
third person. An advocate must persuade the court to consider the en-
vironment into which the snubby is being placed. The reality of crimi-
nal abuse of handguns in California is that 39.7% of all homicides in
1981 were committed with handguns. 9' Of all homicides committed
with firearms, handguns were responsible for approximately 68% of
those deaths.92 Handguns not only play a large role in murder, but also
in robbery and assault.93 Snubbies, in particular, are highly repre-
sented within the category of "crime guns." 94 Of the fifteen handguns
most often used in crime, ten are snubbies Manufacturers cannot
realistically claim that they lack knowledge that their products are used
in a criminal manner. Since manufacturers realize or should realize
this manner of use, their failure to take some type of precaution, such
as designing the handgun with a longer barrel, should be seen as con-
tributing to the plaintiffs injury according to the rationale of O'Hara.
This failure of gun manufacturers to act potentially places others in
positions of unknown or unexpected peril. The intervening criminal
act, therefore, does not become a superseding cause terminating the
manufacturer's liability for defectively designing and manufacturing
the snubby.96
Once the plaintiff establishes that the criminal act is not a supersed-
ing cause and that the snubby was used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, the plaintiffs prima facie case is complete. Under
the holding of Barker, the burden of proof now shifts to the defendant
gun manufacturer who must prove that in light of the evidence pro-
vided by the plaintiff, the social utility of the design of the snubby out-
weighs the inherent risks of that design.
SHIFTING THE BURDEN-RISK V. BENEFIT
After the burden has shifted, the manufacturer must establish that
90. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803-04, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490 (1977); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §449 (1976).
91. See Department of Justice, supra note 67, at 62.
92. See id.
93. See Crime, supra note 57, at 14-15.
94. See Killers, supra note 74, at 5.
95. See id.
96. See generally Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 147, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896
(1962). A camp operator was held liable for injuries sustained by an 11 year old camper when she
was sexually abused. The court held that an intervening act that was criminal in nature could be
found to be reasonably foreseeable. Id.
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the product is not defective despite the evidence in the plaintiff's prima
facie case.97 This task is accomplished by weighing the benefits of the
handgun design against the dangers inherent in that same design.98
California courts have incorporated this burden shifting step because
the manufacturer is usually in the best position to justify the particular
design chosen.99
A jury must consider five factors when evaluating the possible exist-
ence of a defect. These factors include: (1) the gravity of the danger
posed by the challenged design;"°°(2) the likelihood that the danger
would occur; 0 1 (3) the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative de-
sign;"0 2 (4) the financial cost of an improved design; 10 3 and (5) the ad-
verse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would
result from an alternative design."° In order to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case, a defendant must establish that the benefits of a par-
ticular handgun design outweigh the dangers created by the design. 10 5
This analysis relies completely upon a balancing process using the five
Barker factors.'
0 6
Keeping these factors in mind, a strong argument can be made that
the risks posed by the design of a snubby outweigh the potential bene-
fits of that same design. In particular, because of the size of the snub-
bies, these guns seem to be the best weapons for self-defense and
protection. 0 7 The small size permits easy concealment in purses and
pockets.' Regarding concealability, however, the law generally pro-
hibits the carrying of a concealed weapon. 0 9 In addition, the benefits
of carrying a concealed weapon for self-defense are slight) 0 Studies
have shown that victims had an opportunity to use a weapon in only
3.7% of reported crimes."' Moreover, the belief that a concealed
weapon will offer the victim some form of protection is misguided.
Victims who offer armed resistance when attacked are more likely to be
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injured or killed than victims who are unarmed.t"2
The specific design feature of the shorter barrel that makes the
snubby so small is precisely what creates the potential for abuse.I" An
inference can be drawn that the smaller the gun, the larger the propor-
tion of crimes committed with that particular type of gun."t4  For ex-
ample, statistics in California for 1981 show that 39.7% of willful
homicides were committed with handguns as opposed to 5.7% with
rifles and 7% with shotguns." 15 The persuasiveness of this inference is
underscored by the fact that two-thirds of all handguns confiscated in
crimes are snubbies."1
6
Elimination of the snubby would not have a severe impact on the
market since longer barrel alternatives are already in existence." 7 As a
result, manufacturers would not incur additional costs in developing a
new design."' The longer barrel guns would simply absorb the re-
maining market left by the absence of the snubby."19 Furthermore,
consumers would not have to spend more money for these guns. Many
snubbies fall within the same price range as the longer barrel
alternatives.
20
In summary, the dangers posed by snubbies are great because of the
likelihood that snubbies will be used to perpetrate a crime.' 2 ' The
mechanical feasibility of an alternative design is already in existence
and will not cause the manufacturer or consumer to incur additional
costs.' 22 Finally, although the consumer will no longer have the option
of purchasing one particular design of handgun, the adverse conse-
quences do not appear to be great; a major factor in many crimes will
be taken off the market and consumers will be able to meet their needs
with comparable longer barrel alternatives.'23
Once the design of a handgun is found defective and liability for
injury caused by that defect is a possibility, the next step is to decide
how far the scope of liability should extend.2 4 When a handgun
reaches an individual who will foreseeably misuse it, should liability
112. See Guns, supra note 7, at 12.
113. See Transcript, supra note 1, at 8.
114. See generally Department of Justice, supra note 67, at 62.
115. See id.
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extend only to the gun manufacturer, or should liability reach the en-
tire distribution chain down to the retailer?
SCOPE OF LIABILITY
Addressing the issue of the scope of liability, the California Supreme
Court in Kasel v. Remington Arms Company,12 5 formulated the rule that
strict products liability for defective products should fall upon the en-
tire production and marketing chain.' 6 The court reasoned that the
entire chain of distribution was responsible for placing the defective
product into the stream of commerce. 27  Retailers are a part of the
production and marketing chain. Moreover, the retailer is often the
only member of the marketing chain who is accessible to the injured
plaintiff.128 Those who advocate applying strict products liability to
snubby manufacturers believe that once these manufacturers are
threatened with indemnity claims from retailers facing million dollar
judgments and soaring interest rates, the snubby will be taken off the
market or better methods of distribution will result. 129 The manufac-
turer will ultimately have to compensate the retailer or lose a vital link
in the distribution chain. 130 The retailer's liability, therefore, furthers
the goal of safety, thus fulfilling a basic policy of strict products
liability.
131
The rationale for holding retailers liable is clearly explained in Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Company.' 32 In Vandermark, the California
Supreme Court stated that in many cases the injured party will only
have access to the retailer. 33 The retailer, who faces potential liability,
would then exert pressure on the manufacturer to produce a safer prod-
uct.' 34 Through this method, the costs of protection can be adjusted
between the manufacturer and retailer as a part of their continuing
business relationship, thus placing no undue hardship on either of the
parties.
3-
A related issue pertaining to the scope of liability concerns the
proper party to bring a strict products liability action. In California,
the precise legal relationship between the parties has not played a ma-
125. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
126. See id. at 724, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
127. See id.
128. See 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 291 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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133. See id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
134. See Id.
135. See Vanderrark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
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jor role in strict products liability. 36 The plaintiff can be a "mere by-
stander" who is totally unconnected with the distribution chain except
as an ultimate victim. 137 One theory suggests that a bystander requires
even greater protection since he or she generally has no say in the sale
or purchase of the product.' 38 Victims of crime perpetrated through
the use of a snubby certainly can be classified as bystanders since they
have no say in whether the user or consumer should have been allowed
to purchase the gun. This bystander classification promotes the broad
philosophy that the costs and injuries resulting from a defective prod-
uct should be borne by those responsible for placing the product on the
market rather than by those injured and powerless to protect them-
selves. 139 Victims of crime, therefore, should be allowed to bring these
claims against gun manufacturers.
CONCLUSION
Handguns, in general, pose a great risk of danger to the public.
Moreover, specific designs of handguns, such as the snubby, pose an
even greater risk. 140 Although handguns represent only 20% of the
firearm market, 90% of all gun related deaths involve a handgun.' 4 ' To
date, gun control legislation has played a very minor role in reducing
these risks of danger.
142
A solution to the handgun problem may exist in the courts. In par-
ticular, strict products liability law has now developed to the point in
California that it can, and often does, act as an effective tool in encour-
aging manufacturers to design safer products. 143 By discouraging man-
ufacturers from marketing products with defects that endanger the
public, the potential for risk is decreased, and the public interest in
safety is served.'"
This comment has explored the feasibility of applying strict products
liability theories in California to cases involving handguns. The spe-
cific issue addressed is whether manufacturers and retailers of snub-
bies, a particular type of handgun, can be held strictly liable in tort for
the resulting harm caused by the defective design of the snubby. The
success of these strict products liability actions in California depends
136. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (1970).
137. See 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657.
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144. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
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upon the application of the analysis for strict products liability actions
provided in Barker."' Using the Barker analysis, the existence of a
defect can be established through the construction of plaintiff's prima
facie case.'46 Initially, plaintiffs must prove that consumer expectations
of handgun safety are not necessarily met just because a handgun is an
obviously dangerous product. 47 In addition, manufacturers can be
compelled to redesign snubbies because the potential for misuse in
crime is a foreseeable occurrence. 4 8 To complete the prima facie case,
the issue of proximate cause must be addressed by the plaintiff. A con-
clusion can be drawn that the defective design of a snubby is the proxi-
mate cause of injury because the defect is a concurrent cause with the
criminal act that produces the injury. 49 Moreover, an intervening
criminal act will not automatically be a superseding cause of harm be-
cause the criminal act is a foreseeable event.
50
Once the burden of proof shifts to the defendant gun manufacturer,
the risk/benefit test of Barker should be applied.' Unless the defend-
ant can prove that the benefits of a snubby outweigh the risks created
by the small size, a defective design can be found and liability for inju-
ries caused by this defective design will be imposed upon the gun man-
ufacturer." 2 Theories defining the potential scope of liability will
permit victims of crimes to bring these strict products liability actions
as bystanders. 53 Furthermore, retailers as well as manufacturers may
be held liable for injuries caused by the defective design of a snubby
because of the retailer's position in the distribution chain. '
5
1
This comment finds no significant barriers to the application of strict
products liability to actions involving manufacturers of snubbies.
Through the strict products liability cause of action, gun manufacturers
may be encouraged to prevent criminals from obtaining snubbies by
designing and manufacturing guns that are less dangerous.
Those who believe that the right to possess a gun for self-defense or
protection of the home is inalienable undoubtedly will charge that this
form of litigation will only prevent law abiding citizens, not criminals,
from obtaining handguns. Studies have shown, however, that most
145. See supra notes 45-124 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 45-95 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
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1983 / Gun Manufacturers
guns used in crime are new. 55 Therefore, a reduction in the supply of
handguns currently being produced will greatly diminish the supply of
guns available for use in crimes.
Snubbies most often are just a "tool of destruction," and marketing
them to the general public poses an unacceptable risk of injury and
harm to society. Strict products liability may be the only effective way
to reduce this risk of injury by forcing manufacturers to accept respon-
sibility for injuries inflicted by their product.
Rose Safarian
155. See Moore, supra note 18, at 95.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
